










Cullen, G., Gasbarro, D., Monroe, G.S., Shailer, G. and Zhang, Y.Y.  
(2011) Asset securitizations and audit fees. In: 2011 AFAANZ  














http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/39098/     
 
 




Asset Securitizations and Audit Fees 
 
Abstract 
Asset securitizations increase audit complexity andu it risks, which may have an 
impact on audit fees. Using U.S. data from 2003 to 2008, we find that asset 
securitization risks (retained interests) are associated with audit fees after, but not 
before, the global financial crisis (GFC). This suggests auditors neglected 
securitization risks before the GFC. The results are consistent with auditors treating 
securitizations as asset sales rather than secured bo rowings. 
 
Keywords: Audit Fees; Asset Securitization; Bank Holding Companies; Financial 
Crisis 
Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified n the study. 






Asset Securitizations and Audit Fees 
 
1 Introduction 
Auditors have been criticized in relation to asset securitizations following recent 
bank failures and in relation to the global financial crisis. Perceived audit failures 
include not taking appropriate actions in response to securitization fraud (e.g., 
National Century Financial Enterprises Lawsuits against ex-auditors 2007), helping 
companies violate GAAP (e.g., New Century case 2009), inappropriate opinions on 
securitizations and overall insolvency (e.g., Lehman Brothers case 2007) and 
inadequate audit processes (e.g., Fannie Mae scandal 2006). These perceived audit 
failures undermine the financial reporting credibility of the reporting entities and 
harm domestic and global economies (Pearson 2009). 
Prior studies investigate the economic substance of asset securitization risk 
transfers (Kane 1997; Niu and Richardson 2006; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 
2008; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Barth et al. 2009), the extent of risk transfers with 
recourse (Gorton and Souleles 2005; Chen et al. 2008; Higgins and Mason 2004), 
information asymmetry (Cheng et al. 2008), and earnings and capital management in 
asset securitizations (Karaoglu 2005; Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 
2009; Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare 2009; Ambrose et al. 2004). However, despite 
the attendant criticisms of auditors, there is little or no prior research testing the link 
between asset securitizations and auditor behaviour. 
The complexity of asset securitizations and the management’s flexibility to 
choose sale or borrowing accounting treatments (Kane 1997; Shipper and Yohn 2007) 
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make it difficult for auditors to understand the true economic substance of the 
instruments, the financial risk status of the originat ng bank, and the discretionary 
earnings and capital management opportunities created by securitization transactions 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Karaoglu 2005). The challenges and 
auditors’ limitations in this regard also affect the auditors’ risk considerations in audit 
planning and pricing (Houston 1999; Phillips 1999; Beaulieu 2001). If auditors are 
focussed on audit quality or their risk exposure, higher securitization risk should 
induce increased audit effort to maintain an acceptable audit risk level. Self-interested 
auditors who recognize their risk exposure but are constrained from increasing effort 
may price-protect themselves by charging an audit fee premium. Both increased effort 
and fee premia will result in higher audit fees.  
The analysis of audit fees is a basic tool in research into the audit market and 
auditors’ behaviour. Extant studies extensively investigate cross-sectional 
determination and inter-temporal variation in audit fees for indications of variation in 
audit effort and fee premia (Simunic 1980, 1984; Palmrose 1986; Francis and Simon 
1987; Simon and Francis 1988; Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Pratt and Stice 1994; 
Craswell et al. 1995; Bell et al. 2001; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009). However, most 
such studies specifically exclude financial institutions from their analyses because of 
the attendant accounting and risk differences compared to other sectors. Consequently, 
there is relatively little research on audit effort and pricing in the banking industry.  
By applying the established methodology of audit fee studies to investigate how 
asset securitization and other financial risks affect the behaviour of the banks’ auditors, 
we advance our general understanding of auditor behaviour and audit pricing, and 
reduce the current knowledge gap concerning audit of asset securitization disclosures.  
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The audit risk in asset securitizations that is associated with transaction 
complexity, sale or borrowing accounting choice flexibility, and management 
manipulation risk, is represented in the amount of securitized assets (Kane 1997; 
Shipper and Yohn 2007; Landsman et al. 2008; Karaoglu 2005; Minton et al. 2004; 
Matsumoto 2002). Explicit recourse against the originator is significant in securitized 
assets; this is represented in retained interests, which is also sensitive to the reliability 
of fair value estimation conditioned on the economic environment. Therefore, 
following Barth et al. (2009), we use the amount of securitized assets and the amount 
of retained interests to represent asset securitization factors and incorporate these in 
the audit fee model extended for financial institutions in Fields et al. (2004). 
Estimating this using publicly available data on U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) 
from 2003 to 2008, we find that audit fees increase with retained interests (RI) in the 
post-GFC period, but not earlier. This suggests that auditors did not recognize the risk 
of asset securitizations prior to the GFC.   
Asset securitizations are an important source of audit risk and economic 
significance, as revealed by the current financial risis and bank failures. Therefore, 
the cross-sectional and intertemporal views of the association between auditor effort 
or pricing and asset securitizations in this study are important contributions to the 
literatures concerning asset securitization risk and uditor behaviour. The study also 
contributes to the emerging literature on bank audits. This is a growing area of policy 
interest since Basel (2008) called for “more research on bank audits, especially in 
areas that are of particular interest to bank regulators and important to financial 
markets”.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is 
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reviewed in Section 2 and hypotheses are developed in Section 3. Section 4 describes 
the research design and Section 5 reports the main results. Further testing is reported 
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the study.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Asset Securitizations 
Figure 1 displays the procedures of a typical securitization transaction in banks. 
An asset securitization transaction begins with the originating bank transferring a pool 
of financial assets, such as mortgages, loans and leases, to a special purpose entity 
(SPE). The SPE legally isolates the loans beyond the reach of the originating bank 
and its creditors under FAS 140 (formerly FAS 125), but remains part of the 
originating bank’s consolidated entity. To avoid accounting consolidation, the SPE 
becomes a qualifying special purpose entity (QSPE) or transfers the loans to a QSPE. 
The loans are then securitized in ranked tranches. In the absence of credit 
enhancements, the most junior securities tranche is the first to bear credit losses on the 
securitized assets. When the first tranche is exhausted, the remaining liability passes 
to the second junior tranche, and so on until all credit losses are absorbed. Credit 
enhancements insulate senior securities from the default risk on the underlying 
financial assets. Enhancements are provided by the originators, or a third-party 
guarantor, in the form of cash collateral accounts, re erve funds, commitments to 
purchase assets in default, credit derivatives, or recourse provisions. Rating agencies 
are involved in this step to assign ratings to the tranches. Strategically, the most senior 
tranche is usually made as large as possible while stil  obtaining an AAA rating and 
the first (most junior) tranche is usually unrated and made as small as possible while 
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still allowing the second tranche to obtain an investment grade rating (Ryan 2008). 
The most junior tranche(s) is retained by the securitize  for credit enhancement 
purpose and the investment-grade tranches are sold to investors.1 Proceeds are 
transferred through the SPE to the originator. The SPE distributes cash generated by 
the securitized financial assets to the investors, as per the security contracts.  
< Figure 1> 
2.2 Accounting Standards and Accounting Benefits on Asset Securitization 
For 2003 to 2008, accounting for asset securitization is subject to FAS 140 
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of 
Liabilities and FIN 46(R) (an FASB interpretation of ARB 51 relating to consolidation 
of SPEs).2 For securitization to qualify as an asset sale, th transferor must transfer 
the financial assets to a bankruptcy-remote entity and surrender controls of the 
transferred assets. To avoid consolidation, the entity must be a qualifying-SPE 
satisfying conditions specified in FIN 46(R). If the asset transfer qualifies as a sale, 
the illiquid loans are written back and originator recognizes any retained interests and 
servicing assets on its balance sheet; unrealised future cash flows are treated as a 
gains or loss in current income statement.   
FAS 157 imposes a three-level measurement hierarchy for fair value based on 
whether the inputs are “observable” or “unobservable”. Market-priced observable 
inputs are ranked higher and more prioritized over firm-supplied unobservable inputs 
in fair value measurements. When the market price is not observable, firm-supplied 
                                                
1
 We don’t consider the situation that the retained junior tranche(s) may be re-securitized to CDO with more 
complex securitization and credit enhancement procedures. Basically, the effect of such re-securitization is to 
upgrade the formerly un-investable securities to investment-grade securities sold to investors. The balance sheet 
impact is similar to our simple model. 
2
 From 2009, FAS 166 and FAS 167 largely limited the scope of accounting for asset securitization as sales. 
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fair value, usually established with internal models based on assumptions set by the 
firm itself, could be used to fair value measurements. FAS 157 provides support for 
the discretionary use of internal models in the fair value measurements associated 
with asset securitization transactions, especially when the market inputs are not 
reliable and of poor quality signals (e.g., during crisis period), or when the assets or 
liabilities are distinct from the assets or liabilities with available inputs in the market 
(e.g., the assets and liabilities incurred during individual securitizations). 
Appendix 1 Panel A presents a typical accounting procedure for an asset 
securitization transaction under FAS 140, FAS 156 and FAS 166. 3 The basic sale 
accounting treatment on asset securitizations under FAS 140 and FAS 156 is to (1) 
remove the securitization assets from the balance she t; (2) record cash proceeds in 
the amount received and recognize non-cash proceeds at fair value; (3) recognize the 
book value of the retained sub-securities as the proportion of the sub-securities’ fair 
value to the fair value of the securitized assets; (4) recognize the retained interests 
other than sub-securities (e.g. servicing assets) in the same way as retained 
sub-securities before FAS 156 or at fair value after FAS 156; and (5) gains on 
securitizations is recorded as the difference betwen net cash proceeds and the value 
(fair value or carrying amount depends on the type of the assets) of the components of 
assets sold. The sale accounting and non-consolidati n of the SPE as allowed by FAS 
140 /156 and FIN 46R bring the following accounting benefits to the originating bank 
                                                
3 Although the changes in accounting standards from FAS 140 to FAS 156 are significant in some aspects of asset 
securitizations, to the extent of the scope studied in this paper, the change has very limited impact on the sale or 
borrowing accounting issue. The requirement changes of fair value measurement to servicing assets in FAS 156 
also limitedly affect our study as servicing assets are not a focus of this study and only represent small portion of 
retained interests.  
  The application of FAS 166 and FAS 167 has almost excluded the opportunity of sale accounting and 
non-consolidation of asset securitization. However, they are implemented at the end of 2009 and irrelevant to 




as displayed in Appendix 1 Panel B, including: (1) A lower leverage ratio, mainly 
because the loan liability has been removed from the balance sheet. (2) A better 
liquidity ratio. (3) A higher profitability. (4) A possibly more flexible and favourable 
risk-based capital ratio. Meanwhile, due to the manipulation opportunities created to 
easily hide changes in credit policy, subjective fair value evaluation on retained 
interests and gains on sales recorded in the income statement (Scism 1998), 
securitization accounting may have a negative impact on true and fair financial 
reporting. 
< Appendix 1> 
2.3 Empirical research topics on asset securitization 
The following empirical topics have been extensively studied by prior literature. 
2.3.1 Sale or borrowing: the economic substance of asset securitization on risk 
transfer 
Regulators, rating agencies and capital market have opposite views on the 
economic substance of asset securitization. At least before the reformation of 
securitization regulations and rules in response to the financial crisis (FAS 166 and 
FAS 167), standard setters and regulators view the ass t securitization as a sale and a 
transfer of risks to the extent of the components of assets transferred (FAS 140; FIN 
46R). Although rating agencies explicitly document that they treat asset securitization 
as a secured borrowing (S&P Corporate Rating Criteria 2001 &2008), the empirical 
evidence gives an opposite answer (Barth et al. 2009; Rosenkranz 2009; Cheng and 
Neamtiu 2009). Differently, the equity market and bond market tend to view 
securitization as an incomplete transfer of control and risk, and treat it as a secured 
borrowing in relation to its risk and value relevance (Mian & Smith 1994; Kane 1997; 
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Ryan 1997; Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and Richardson 2006; Shipper and Yohn 
2007; Hansel & Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Barth et al. 
2009).  
2.3.2 Implicit or explicit recourse: the extent of risk transfer in asset securitization 
The issue of implicit or explicit recourse is more about the extent of risks 
transferred. Measured with explicit recourse, which is accepted in the legal form, the 
extent of risk retained by the originator is explicitly limited to the extent of its 
retained interests, and the gap between total securitized assets and the retained 
interests are deemed fully transferred to the investors with all the risks and rewards. If 
adopting the implicit recourse argument, which is held by the market participants and 
academics (Gorton and Souleles 2005; Cheng et al. 2008), the originators actually do 
not have effective risk transfer on the securitized assets, and the extent of risk retained 
is simultaneously correspondent to the credit risk of the underlying assets and limited 
to the total amount of securitized assets (Higgins a d Mason 2004; Calomiris and 
Mason 2004; Gorton and Souleles 2005). 
2.3.3 Information quality in asset securitization: information asymmetry 
Despite several early theoretical arguments that securitizations can in fact reduce 
information uncertainty4, recent empirical evidence and analyses hold that asset 
securitizations increase information uncertainty and symmetry. (1) The complexity 
and flexibility in structuring and accounting treatments lead to information 
                                                
4
 Before the crisis, people believe that securitization can in fact reduce information uncertainty. (1) Securitization 
requires disclosure of more information than non-securitized assets, e.g. the types of securitized assets, basic 
quality measures of the loans (Foley et al. 1999; Schwarcz 2004). The increased transparency with regard to the 
underlying loans mitigates info asymmetry. (2) Rating agencies published ratings on securities periodically and 
provide 3rd party monitoring on securitized assets. (3) The underlying assets are subject to stricter disclosure 
requirements under securitization (Foley et al. 1999).  
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uncertainty and asymmetry (Modigliani-Miller 1958; Barth et al. 2003). The financial 
reporting choices in asset securitization (e.g., sale or borrowing, QSPE) simplify the 
underlying economics behind securitization and cannot fully describe the complex 
securitization transactions (Schwzrcz 2004; Ryan 2007) thereby leave further space 
for information uncertainty and asymmetry. (2) The economic and accounting benefits 
are gained at the expense of information asymmetry (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; 
Chordia et al. 2001; Easley and O’Hara 2002; Cheng t al. 2008). Using various 
information asymmetry measures5  to investigate information asymmetry in 
securitizations, Cheng et al. (2008) find that securitization leads to greater information 
asymmetry measured by forecast dispersion, ask-bid spread, and stock return volatility. 
Information uncertainty and asymmetry in asset securitizations particularly exists in 
three important areas. (1) The true risk status of the securitized assets is veiled behind 
the securitization transactions (Minton et al. 2004). (2) The creation of retained 
interests may have mitigated information asymmetry on asset quality as retained 
interests provide protections against losses (Pennacchi 1988). However, it creates 
another information asymmetry on the private information about expected cash flows 
with regard to the retained tranches and the underlying assets, discount rate 
assumptions, and other assumptions for the fair value estimation (as most of the RI do 
not have a market price). (3) The earnings numbers are easily manipulated via the 
asymmetric information of securitization gains. 
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2.3.4 Earnings and capital management in asset securitization: an effective tool of 
information manipulation and creative accounting 
The basic earnings numbers are important indicators f  bank stakeholders 
especially non-sophisticated stakeholders and affect th  contracting conditions of the 
banks with their stakeholders. Additionally, bank managers’ explicit compensation 
and/or implicit rewards may rely heavily on earnings disclosed. Prior literature 
supports that earnings numbers are discretionarily manipulated for various reasons 
(Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Matsumoto 2002). In addition, capital 
management is another type of opportunistic manipulation on financial statements, 
which can be achieved via earnings management (Moyer 1990). There are four ways 
in which bank managers use securitization for discretionary purposes: (1) timing 
(Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009); (2) classification of sales 
versus borrowings (Karaoglu 2005); (3) selection of loans to be securitized (Pavel & 
Phillis 1987; Ambrose et al. 2004; Minton et al. 2004); and (4) valuation of retained 
interests (see Appendix 1. FAS 157; Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare 2009). 
3 Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Securitized Assets and Audit Fees 
The purpose of an audit is to provide assurance on an entity’s financial reports to 
be free from material omissions or misstatements, or in other words, audits are 
designed to reduce the audit risk to certain level (L mon et al. 1993). Audit risk is the 
risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial report 
is materially misstated (SAS No. 47), which is a function of inherent risk, control risk 
and detection risk. Higher inherent risk and/or contr l risk leads to greater resources 
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(efforts) auditors allocated in order to maintain the otal audit risk under an acceptable 
level (Felix et al. 2001; Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997; O’Keefe et al. 1994; Pratt 
and stice 1994; O’ Sullivan 2000; Bell et al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Lyon 
and Maher 2005; Hay et al. 2006). In summary, audit efforts is associated with audit 
risk and audit efforts via inherent and/or control risks. 
The association of the amount of securitization andinherent risk is reflected in 
three aspects. First, even a simplified asset securitization transaction involves multiple 
participants from the originator, SPE, QSPE, the guarantor, the rating agency, to the 
investors and hence complex procedures between them, attached with sophisticated 
documents. For parties except for the securitization specialists, the transaction 
procedures are complex and the documents are too sophisticated to be understood. 
Therefore, although the initial purpose of asset securitization is to reduce lender’s 
credit risk via packaging the loans into sellable securities, the higher complexity and 
lack of transparency in asset securitization transactions require more audit efforts. 
Second, the sale accounting and non-consolidation treatment under FAS No. 140 
and FIN 46R veils the true economic substance and fi ancial risk status of the 
originating banks and thereby increases inherent risk. Empirical evidence universally 
views the “control” of the securitized assets is largely still with the originators (Kane 
1997; Shipper and Yohn 2007). With regard to the risks and rewards, abundant 
research from 1990s till now reveals that there is no actual credit risk transfer from 
originators in asset securitizations (Mian & Smith 1994; Barth et al. 2009; Ryan 1997; 
Niu and Richardson 2006; Hansel & Krahnan 2007; Treacy and Carey 1998; Chen et 
al. 2008, Landsman et al. 2008). However, accounting standards (FAS 140; FIN 46R) 
and regulations (BASEL I) allow for sale accounting and non-consolidation of QSPE 
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from originators instead of secured borrowing accounting. Compared with secured 
borrowing accounting, sale accounting plus non-consolidation treatment dresses up 
leverage, liquidity, earnings numbers, and capital ratio. As illustrated in Appendix 1, 
for a hypothetical bank with 12.5% total assets securitized and about 10% ROI before 
the securitization, after a securitization with sale ccounting, its leverage (10) is 3.06 
lower than the leverage (13.06) under secured borrowing accounting treatment; the 
liquidity ratio also gets an immediate improvement; the ROE doubles from 10% to 
21.7% after the securitization with sale accounting; and the regulatory capital ratio is 
accordingly improved with a reduction in risk-weighted assets and an increase in the 
earnings numbers. These accounting treatments therefor  distort the true risk status as 
well as the financial performance of the originating banks, and hence lead to the 
inherent risk of misstatement of going concern opinions and financial performance in 
financial reporting.  
Third, securitization transactions create discretionary opportunities for earnings 
and capital management, which are an indispensable source of inherent risk. Due to 
its complexity and flexibility in structuring and accounting treatments, securitization 
transactions lead to great information asymmetry betwe n the originators and 
subsequent investors as suggested by Modigliani-Miller (1958) capital structure 
irrelevance theorem, and as evidenced in a series of research (Pennacchi 1998; 
Minton et al. 2004; Schwzrcz 2004; Ryan 2007). Managers of the originating banks 
have incentives to make earnings management (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Degeorge, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Matsumoto 2002) and capital management (Moyer 1990; 
Karaoglu 2005). They utilize the discretionary opportunity created by the information 
imbalance between the originators and investors for manipulation purposes (Karaoglu 
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2005; Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009; Pavel & Phillis 1987; 
Ambrose et al. 2004). The risk of earnings management and aggressive financial 
reporting is considered by auditors in audit planning and pricing as experimentally 
(Houston 1999; Phillips 1999; Beaulieu 2001) and empirically evidenced (Gul et al. 
2003; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Lyon and Maher 2005).  
 In conclusion, asset securitization is more complex and lack of transparency 
than ordinary banking transactions; sale accounting and non-consolidation treatments 
distort the overall risk status and financial performance of originating banks; 
moreover, the originating banks have incentives andopportunities to use asset 
securitization for earnings and capital management. These activities lead to great 
inherent risk to auditors, and hence attract additional audit efforts accordingly. To 
investigate whether or not auditors are able to capture the asset securitization risks 
reflected in the amount of the securitized assets, we establish the directional 
prediction on the association between audit fees and the securitized assets:  
 
H1: Audit fees are positively associated with the amount of securitized assets. 
 
3.2 Retained Interests and Audit Fees 
Alternative to Hypothesis 1, auditors’ risk consideration to asset securitizations 
may be associated with another important asset securitization factor, the retained 
interests. Empirical evidence indicates two opposite v ews on the economic and risk 
substance of asset securitizations. Regulators and standard setters treat asset 
securitizations as sales of assets and believe that the risk retained by the originator 
restricted to the extent of retained interests (FAS 140; FIN 46R). Oppositely, the 
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financial market holds asset securitizations as secured borrowings, and the risk 
retained should be extended to the total amount of the securitized assets, especially 
under unfavourable market conditions (Mian & Smith 1994; Kane 1997; Ryan 1997; 
Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and Richardson 2006; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Hansel & 
Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2009).  
If auditors take the market participants’ point of view (secured borrowing), their 
audit risk consideration rests with the total amount of the securitized assets, especially 
under unfavourable situations, and retained interes only represent the components 
that bear the first risk of losses on the securitized asset which are designed to be 
sufficient enough to cover credit risks of underlying assets only under predictable 
circumstances. Therefore, the audit fees are mainly ssociated with the total amount 
of the securitized assets, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, when 
auditors adopt the regulators and standard setters’ point of view (sale of assets), their 
audit risk consideration is restricted to the components of retained interests, in the 
forms of interest-only stripes, servicing assets and retained junior tranche(s) of 
securities. In this case, a positive association betwe n audit fees and retained interests 
rather than audit fees and total securitized assets i  expected. Therefore, we make a 
directional prediction on the association between audit fees and retained interests, 
which is in response to and comparable with H1:  
 
H2: Audit fees are positively associated with the amount of retained interests. 
 
It is notable that two other issues may also affect auditors’ risk assessment on the 
information provided by retained interests. First, the value of retained interests is 
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based on the fair value estimation on the securitizat on components (FAS 140; FAS 
157), and due to the lack of market consensus price, the fair value estimation to 
components usually relies on certain subjective assumptions of default rates, 
prepayment rates and discount rates (FAS 157). Therefor , the reliability of fair value 
estimation is sensitive to the economic environment a d is also subject to 
management manipulation (Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare 2009). Second, 
empirical research evidences the existence of implicit recourse to subsidize the SPE 
investors for any default losses related to the transferred assets (Higgins and mason 
2004; Calomiris and Mason 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Gorton & Souleles 2005). It 
implies that the actual guarantee provided by the originator is not limited to the extent 
of retained interests, but cover the overall credit risk of the underlying assets limited 
to the total amount of securitized assets in case of ec nomic difficulties. If it is the 
case, although retained interests represent explicit recourse of originators to investors, 
due to the subjective fair value estimation and the existence of implicit recourse, the 
retained interests should be no more important thanother components in judging the 
true risk association between the originator and the securitized assets for auditors.  
3.3 The Changes of the Association between Audit Fees and Asset Securitizations 
after GFC 
The year 2007 saw great downward changes in the economic environment due to 
the GFC, especially for the banking industry. Asset securitizations are identified to be 
partially responsible for the economic downturn. Weinvestigate if auditors’ response 
to asset securitization factors has changed after GFC. For an audit, the changing 
economic environment relates to the variation of audit risk factors including: 
constraints on the availability of capital and credit, going concern and liquidity issues, 
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the discretion and complexity in using off-balance-sheet financings, SPEs, and other 
complex financing arrangements, significant estimation and valuation uncertainty 
resulted from market volatility. It also relates to the client’s overall business risk and 
whether the client could achieve their strategic objectives (AICPA 2009). Both risk 
consideration should be addressed by auditors to either modify the audit efforts 
adequately or charge a fee premium for the adjusted expected legal liabilities. 
Therefore, we expect that auditors would pay more att ntion to asset securitization 
risks after the GFC.  
 
H3:  Audit fees are higher relative to asset securitizat on risks after GFC. 
H3-1: Audit fees are higher relative to SA after GFC. 
H3-2: Audit fees are higher relative to RI after GFC. 
  
The asset securitization risks could be represented by the amount of securitized 
assets (like H1) or by the amount of the retained interests (like H2), depending on 
auditors’ understanding of the economic substance ad/or the extent of risk transfer of 
asset securitizations.  
3.4 The impact of asset securitizations on audit pricing to credit risks 
Fields et al. (2004) suggest a positive association between audit fees and bank 
credit risks. Specifically, banks with higher level of commercial loans, mortgage loans 
and intangible assets are charged higher audit fees by auditors; banks with higher 
level of problematic assets (proxied by non-performance loan ratio and the charge-off 
ratio) are charged higher audit fees by auditors.  
Asset securitizations have effects of dressing up on-balance-sheet credit risks by 
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removing on-balance-sheet financial assets off the balance sheet. We argue that the 
awareness of the risks embedded in asset securitizations will trigger auditors’ 
suspicion on auditees’ on-balance-sheet credit risks and more audit efforts on credit 
risk evaluation and assurance, leading to higher audit fees. Measuring the credit risks 
with asset structure proxies (commercial loan ratio, mortgage loan ratio, and 
intangible asset ratio) and problematic asset proxies (the non-performance loan ratio 
and the charge-off ratio): 
 
H4: As asset securitization risks increase, audit fees increase relative to credit risks.  
H4-1: As SA increases, audit fees increase relative to credit risks.  
H4-2: As RI increases, audit fees increase relative to credit risks.  
 
The asset securitization risks could be represented by the amount of securitized 
assets or by the amount of the retained interests, depending on auditors’ understanding 
of the economic substance and/or the extent of risk transfer of asset securitizations.  
4 Research Design 
4.1 Model 
The basic model is adapted from the Fields et al. (2004) bank audit fee model.  
Fields et al. (2004) paper uses SENSITIVE, the net int rest sensitive assets divided by 
total assets, to measure the bank’s interest sensitivity.  SENSITIVE is not a significant 
variable in the Fields et al. (2004) model either for the 2000 bank sample or for the 
2003-2008 BHC samples. The importance of interest snsitive assets should be linked 
with the magnitude and the direction of interest rate changes. Therefore, we modify this 
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variable to SENSITIVE*∆INT in our tests by multiplying the annual changes in the 
official interest rates of Federal Reserve Banks. We add INTDERIV6, the notional 
amount of interest rate derivatives divided by total assets, into the model to capture 
off-balance-sheet interest rate risks. The effect of interest rate derivatives to audit fees 
is in two folds. First, the interest rate risk from on-balance-sheet assets and liabilities 
could be hedged by off-balance-sheet interest rate derivatives, leading to reduced 
business risk and reduced audit fees. On the other hand, interest rate derivatives can be 
used for speculation purposes, hence exaggerating the in erest rate risk and increase 
audit fees. In addition, the complexity of derivaties leads to increased audit fees.  
 
    
                                                             (1)  
 
Where: 
LNAF: the natural logarithm of audit fee; 
LNTA: the natural logarithm of total assets; 
BIG4: =1 when the incumbent auditor belongs to Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
LOSS: = 1 when the net income reports a negative number, 0 otherwise; 
STDRET: the corresponding one-year standard deviation of daily stock returns; 
SAVING: =1 when the BHC is a savings institution, 0 otherwise;  
                                                
6
 The appropriateness of using INTDERIV to measure interest rate risk needs discussion.  
Banks could use interest rate derivatives to hedge on-balance-sheet interest rate risks.  
Supposing the only purpose that banks use interest rate derivatives is to hedge their on-balance-sheet interest 
rate risks, a higher proportion of interest rate derivatives leading to lower risks and lower audit fees. However, the 
notional amount of the derivatives and the amount of the on-balance-sheet position hedged might not be the 
same. (Under the derivative mechanism, the derivative amount is affected by both the amount of the hedged 
position and the date to maturity of the derivative and the hedged position.)     
Overall, the effect of INTDERIV to interest rate risk is not clear. However, it is still a good measure of 






















TRANSACCT: transaction accounts, including Non-interest-earning demand deposit 
accounts (DDAs), interest-bearing checking accounts in NOW accounts, automatic 
transfer from savings (ATS) accounts, and Money Market deposit accounts (MMDAs, 
divided by total deposit; 
SECURITIES: investment security accounts divided by total assets; 
EFFICIENCY: the efficiency ratio, defined as the ratio of total operating expense to 
total revenue (net interest income plus non-interes income); 
COMMLOAN: the proportion of commercial loans to gross loans; commercial loans 
involve commercial and industrial loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances 
issued by other banks, and obligations (other than securities) of states and political 
subdivision; we also include commercial mortgage and gricultural loans in the 
commercial loan category; 
NONPERFORM: non-performing loans/gross loans; 
CHGOFF: net charge-offs/loan loss reserve; 
MTGLOAN: residential mortgage loans/gross loans; 
CAPRATIO: risk-adjusted capital ratio, defined as total amount of bank regulatory 
capital divided by risk-weighted assets; 
INTANG: intangible assets/total assets; 
SENSITIVE* ∆INT: on-balance-sheet interest rate risk measure, defined as (interest 
rate-sensitive assets - interest rate-sensitive liabilit es)/total assets, all multiplied by 
interest rate change in the current year; 
INTDERIV: the notional amount of interest rate derivatives divided by total assets. 
SA: total outstanding securitized assets, deflated by total assets (Barth, Ormazabal, 
and Taylor 2009); 
RI: total retained interests, including retained interest only strips, retained credit 
enhancements, and Unused commitments to provide liquidity (service advances), 
deflated by total assets (Barth, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2009); 
GOS: the amount of gains on securitization, defined as the net income (loss) from 
securitizations deflated by securitized assets (Barth, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2009). 
 
The two test variables, the amount of securitized assets (SA) and the amount of 
retained interests (RI), represent asset securitization risk factors as identified in Barth 
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et al. (2009). SA/RI measures the misstatement risk a sociated with asset 
securitizations based on the borrowing/sale accounting assumption. If auditors view 
asset securitizations as sales, the misstatement risk related is based on the retained 
interest amount; if auditors view asset securitizations as borrowings, the misstatement 
risk is based on the total securitized asset amount. This measure also relates to the 
bank’s overall credit risk and the misstatement risk in auditors’ going concern 
reporting. As the core financial risk of banks, credit risk have direct impacts on bank’s 
going concern status. Thereby, in auditors’ perception, whether credit risk is 
associated with total securitization amount or only with the retained interests is crucial 
for auditors in making their judgment on going concern status. GOS measures the 
misstatement risk related to earnings reporting. Prior research has demonstrated that 
manipulating gains on securitizations could be an effective tool in earnings 
management and capital management (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; 
Matsumoto 2002; Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009). GOS is a 
control variable only when the BHC is a securitizer. 
4.2 Data Source and Criteria 
Bank audit data are collected from Audit-Analytics. Following prior research 
(e.g., Barth, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2009; Chen, Liu and Ryan2008; Karaoglu 2004), 
we extract the financial statement data plus asset securitization and derivative details 
from Y9C quarterly reports filed with Bank Regulatory by BHCs that have total assets 
exceeding $150 million. The lower limit of $150 million does not affect our result as 
the majority of banks performing asset securitization activities are in the size larger 
than this limit. Securitization details are disclosed in Schedule HC-S, <Servicing, 
Securitization and Asset Sale Activities> of Y9C reports, first introduced in Y9C 
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reports from the second quarter of 2001. One-year standard deviation of daily stock 
return is an independent variable in the audit fee model, which is calculated from 
daily stock prices and dividend information collected from CRSP database. Interest 
rate information is obtained from U.S. Treasury and FRB official disclosures. The 
economic condition indicator, NYSE Financial Sector Index is extracted from NYSE 
official website.  
We first match bank financial statement data with CRSP/Compustat merged data 
via CRSP-FRB link provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York7. The linked 
dataset has identification items such as CIK (SEC registrant header code), CUSIP 
(Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures code) and LPERMCO 
(Company permanent name). We match the linked dataset with CRSP via LPERMCO, 
and Audit-Analytics via CIK (in Audit-Analytics, ref rs to Company_FKEY).  
4.3 Sample 
We restrict our sample to the BHCs. First, in firms performing securitization 
activities, BHCs represent a relatively large and economically important sample 
(Barth, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2009). Niu and Richardson (2006) indicate the 
intensity of securitization related transactions in the traditional financial sector is 
stronger than in other sectors. Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2009) report that 
BHCs are the primary securitizers of assets. Second, as stated in Chen, Liu and 
Ryan(2008), restricting to bank sample could reduce the external validity of studying 
a multi-industry sample, increase the power of control for factors other than interested 
variables, and obtain greater ability to observe the effect of the securitization risks. 
Third, Bank Regulatory Database provides sufficient data on financial statement and 





securitization activities of BHCs since the second quarter of 2001 based on Y9C 
reports to Federal Reserve. As securitization data are only available on Y9C Bank 
Regulatory reports after the second quarter of 2001, and RI information is available 
after 2003, the study covers the period from 2003 to 2008.  
After matching audit fees, bank financial numbers, and CRSP one-year standard 
deviation of stock returns, the sample consists of 2138 firm-year observations. We 
delete two observations that report extreme CAPRATIO (risk-adjusted capital ratio) as 
at 0.16% (IBERIABank, 2008) and 1155% (Fidelity Southern Corp, 2007) as input 
errors. We further winsorize all the explanatory variables at their 1 and 99 percentiles.   
The above procedures leave us with 2,136 firm-year observations for the period 
from 2003 to 2008, belonging to 452 U.S. BHCs, as the final sample. It can be 
partitioned into two subsamples—the securitizers (N=274) and the non-securitizers 
(N=1,862). Further partitioning the securitizer subample into securitizers with RI>0 
and securitizers with RI=0, there are 178 firm-year observations with more than zero 
retained interest balances.  
<Figure 2> 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Some selected variables are also 
plotted in Figure 3. The average (median) audit fees for the sampled BHCs are 
$1,210,067 ($268,447). The average audit fees exhibit an upward trend from 2003 to 
2008. In terms of auditor choice, Fields et al. (2004) report more than 70% of BHCs 
audited by Big N auditors in 2000. Our sample indicates a decreasing proportion of 
BHCs audited by Big N auditors since then, from 57.3% BHCs audited by Big N 
auditors in 2003 to 42.8% in 2008. Simunic and Stein (1996) and Fields et al. (2004) 
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explain the lower ratio of Big-N audits than in other industries as that increased 
litigation risk in the banking industry results in a shift from larger to smaller audit 
firms. Ettredge et al. (2009) state that the decrease in Big N audits in BHCs reflects 
client migration to small auditors after SOX 404 became effective. In addition, the 
average audit fees and total assets values are all much lower in Non-Big N audits than 
in Big N audits, implying that large BHCs still choose Big N audit firms as their 
auditors, while small BHCs are more likely to shift to Non-Big N auditors. 
The average total assets follow a similar increasing pattern. The mean values are 
more than 10 times larger than the median values for the pool data and the yearly data, 
indicating the sample is highly right-skewed. The highly right skewed sample pattern 
is common in banking research, e.g., Fields et al. (2004), Karaoglu (2005), Chen et al. 
(2008) and Ettredge et al. (2009). Fields et al. (2004) attribute it to several very large 
BHCs in the sample. 
Although the average LOSS is stable before GFC, there is a sharp increase in the 
proportion of BHCs experiencing loss after GFC. Correspondingly, with the 
consideration that the asset composition is generally stable during the period (e.g. 
TRANSACCT, COMMLOAN, MTGLOAN etc.), asset quality experience an 
unfavourable change after GFC, as reflected in the non-performing loan ratio 
(NONPERFORM) and the charge-off ratio (CHGOFF).  
The average interest rate sensitivity of the pool data is 9.5%, comparable with 
Fields et al. (2004). As the interest rate risk might be sensitive to the interest rate 
fluctuation, we multiply the interest rate sensitivity with the annual changes in the 
official interest rates (SENSITIVE*∆INT) to capture the movement of 
on-balance-sheet interest rate sensitivity in respon e to the changes of interest rate of 
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the concurrent years. To complete the picture, we also include an off-balance-sheet 
interest rate risk measure-the ratio of interest rate derivatives (INTDERIV) into this 
study, with the mean value of 0.269 for the pool data.  
<Table 1> 
<Figure 3> 
The amounts of securitization activities are widely diversified and highly 
right-skewed. Table 2 indicate that most BHCs did not undertake securitization 
activities. Of the 2,136 sampled firm-year observations, 1,862 (87.17%) observations 
did not have outstanding securitized assets; and 1,958 (91.67%) observations had no 
retained interests. Securitizations are clustered in the largest BHCs. There are 99.62% 
($9,983,352 million) outstanding securitized assets held by 178 of the 300 largest 
firm-year observations measured by total assets. Among the Top 50 BHC securitizers 
ranked by the amount of securitized assets during the period 2003 to 2008, the four 
largest BHCs, saying Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo & Co., and J. P. 
Morgan Chase & Co. are listed in the Top 5 securitizers. Countrywide Financial and 
MBNA were purchased by Bank of America, in 2005 and 2008 respectively. Bank 
One merged with JP Morgan Chase & Co. in 2004; and Wachovia was purchased by 
Wells Fargo at the end of 2008.  
<Table 2> 
4.5 Correlations 
Table 3 shows Pearson correlations between the regression variables and 
p-values from the two-tailed tests. The logarithm of audit fees (LNAF) is highly 
correlated with most of the control variables except for SECURITIES. The asset 
securitization measures, namely SA and RI are highly correlated with each other (Corr. 
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Coef. 0.277, p<0.0001), and they are both significantly correlated with LNAF 
(p<0.0001). SA and RI are also correlated with a number of control variables. The 
positive correlation between asset securitization measures and LNTA support the view 
that asset securitizations are more likely to occur in large BHCs. We explain the 
positive correlation between asset securitization measures and Big N auditors as that 
the complexity of asset securitization transactions forces BHCs to go to Big N audit 
firms rather than small audit firms. The significantly positive correlations between 
loan quality measures (NONPERFORM and CHGOFF) and asset securitization 
measures suggest that BHCs with greater loan quality problems are more likely to 
undertake asset securitization transactions.  
The derivative measure INTDERIV is positively correlat d with LNAF, 
implying auditors charge higher audit fees for BHCs with larger proportions of 
interest rate derivative positions. Derivative trans ctions are higher for BHCs with 
larger size and Big N clients. The positive correlations of INTDERIV with 
COMMLOAN, CHGOFF, NONPERFORM, and INTANG indicate tha  interest rate 
derivatives are used as an active risk management tool in BHCs. On the other hand, 
derivative positions are lower for BHCs with higher market volatility, higher 
proportion of investment securities, and higher propo tion of mortgage loans.  In 
addition, SA and RI are both positively correlated with INTDERIV.  
<Table 3> 
5 Results 
5.1 The Validity of Modified BHC Audit Fee Model 
The comparison of the validity of Fields et al. (2004) model and the modified 
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audit fee model used in this study is shown in Table 4. Fields et al. (2004) model still 
fits well for the pooled sample. LNTA, BIGN, SECURITIES8, EFFICIENCY, 
NONPERFORM, CAPRATIO and INTANGIBLE are still significant determinants 
for the pooled data and report the same signs as Fields et al. (2004). In particular, Big 
N auditors charge a significant fee premium for bank clients. SECURITIES is 
significantly negative in our sample while significantly positive in Fields et al. (2004). 
As SECURITIES is defined as 1 minus investment securities/total assets in Fields et 
al. (2004) but defined as investment securities/total assets in this study, this result is 
consistent with Fields et al. (2004). STDRET and MTGLOAN are also significant but 
report opposite signs to Fields et al. (2004). 
Fields et al. (2004) paper uses SENSITIVE, the net i terest sensitive assets 
divided by total assets, to measure the bank’s interes  sensitivity.  SENSITIVE is not 
a significant variable in the Fields et al. (2004) model either for the 2000 bank sample 
or for the 2003-2008 BHC data. The increase (decrease) of interest-rate generally 
benefits banks with more net interest-sensitive assets (liabilities). During periods of 
increasing interest rates, banks with higher net-interest-sensitive asset gap would have 
higher net interest income and less risk, and thereby be charged a lower audit fees, 
ceteris paribus; The US experienced 17 consecutive interest-rate increases from June 
2004 to June 2006 due to inflation concerns, however, the interest rate was 
continuously decreasing afterwards. Therefore it would be clearer to investigate the 
association between SENSITIVE and audit fees if we consider the changes in the 
interest rate in this measure.  
We modify the BHC audit fee model by measuring market isk with two interest 




rate variables. SENSITIVE*∆INT represents on-balance-sheet interest rate risk w th 
an adding consideration on the impact of changing interest rate to market sensitivity.  
INTDERIV measures off-balance-sheet interest rate risk; it also indicates the 
involvement of the BHC into derivative activities. As presented in Table 4, the 
modified model explains more variations of audit fees than Fields et al. (2004) model. 
Additionally, both SENSITIVE*∆INT and INTDERIV are significantly and 
positively associated with LNAF (p<0.01) for the pooled sample. The positive 
significance of SENSITIVE*∆INT and INTDERIV for the pooled sample holds 
robust when we add asset securitization factors, pot GFC dummy variable, or the 
changes in financial index into the model, indicating that auditors charge higher audit 
fees on both on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet int rest rate risks. Further 
estimating on the yearly samples, the modified audit fee model fits well for the yearly 
samples, showing stable and consistent results on LNTA, BIGN, EFFICIENCY, and 
INTDERIV with the pooled sample.  
We apply Chow tests to signal the structural changes of the audit fee model 
before and after GFC. Taking the post-GFC indicator s the breaking point, both the 
Fields et al. (2004) model and the modified audit fees exhibit a significant change (all 
the p-values <0.001). 
<Table 4> 
5.2 Audit Fees and Asset Securitizations 
To capture the association between audit fees and asset securitizations, we add 
three asset securitization variables into the modifie  audit fee model. Among them, 
SA and RI are the two test variables on hypothesis t ting. To analyse the changes in 
the audit pricing to asset securitizations, we further add a GFC indicator—PGFC, and 
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two interaction terms—SA*PGFC and RI*PGFC into the model.  The association 
between audit fees and asset securitizations for the pooled sample, before and after 
GFC, and for the yearly samples are reported in Table 5.  
Contrary to the predictions in H1 and H2, the pooled data result does not show 
direct associations between audit fees and asset securitization factors for the period 
from 2003 to 2008, indicating that asset securitizat on risks are not significantly 
noticed by BHC auditors in this period.    
H3 predicts an increase in audit pricing on asset securitization items before and 
after the GFC. Taking the year 2007 as the separation point, before GFC, asset 
securitizations are commonly recognized as an effective tool to facilitate liquidity, 
manage risks and improve the bank performance for banks although there are some 
different voices from academics. The GFC reminded the markets about the risks and 
potential impacts of asset securitizations to banks and to the economy. The pooled 
sample shows a significant increase in overall audit fees after GFC (p<0.0001). The 
interaction term RI*PGFC is positively associated with LNAF, suggesting that there is 
an increase in audit pricing to the retained interests after GFC, consistent with the 
prediction in H3-2. 
Splitting the pooled sample into pre-GFC and post-GFC subsamples, SA and GOS 
are associated with LNAF neither before nor after GFC, contrary to the prediction of 
H1. The pre-GFC RI is not significant to LNAF, whic is contrary to H2; however 
after GFC, RI has been positively associated with LNAF (Coef. 7.70, p=0.017), 
supporting H2. The results imply a great increase in audit pricing on asset 
securitization risks after the financial crisis, focusing on the retained interest part. 
Specifically, auditors do not price asset securitization risks before GFC. In the years 
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after 2007 (inclusive), perhaps due to the explicit impact of GFC on the economy and 
the banking industry, auditors gave more consideration on asset securitization risks as 
reflected in the audit pricing. However, auditors only focused on RI instead of SA, 
indicating that auditors still believed the risk of asset securitization were restricted to 
the retained interest component, and support the view that asset securitization 
transactions are sales of assets rather than secured bo rowings. Therefore, auditors’ 
perception of asset securitization risks is similar to standard setters and regulators 
understanding to asset securitization risks, but opposite to the market participants’ 
point of view even during the period after GFC.  
<Table 5> 
5.3 The Impact of Asset Securitizations on Audit Pricing to Credit Risks 
We report the effects of asset securitizations on audit pricing to credit risk factors 
in Table 6. We select the ratio of commercial loans, mortgage loans and intangible 
assets to proxy for the credit risks in terms of asset tructure and the non-performing 
loan ratio and charge-off ratio as the proxies for the asset quality. The effects of asset 
securitizations to audit pricing to specific credit risk factors are represented by the 
interactions between asset securitization measures and credit risk measures. The 
changes in these effects after GFC are reflected by multiplying the interaction terms 
with the PGFC indicator. 
Setting the significance criteria at p=0.05, we cannot find evidence that asset 
securitizations have impacts on the associations between asset-structural-credit risks 
and audit fees for the pooled sample. However, further interactions with the PGFC 
indicator suggest that auditors increase their pricing to commercial loans and 
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intangible assets when the BHC shows a higher proporti n of retained interests9.  
Similarly, on the impacts of asset securitizations  pricing to asset quality measures, 
auditors also increase their pricing to credit risks represented by problematic asset 
quality when the BHCs have a higher level of retained interests.  The overall results 
are consistent with the expectation of H4-2 and also cross-support the views of H2 
and H3-2.  
<Table 6> 
6 Additional Analyses 
6.1 Controlling for Changes in Macroeconomic Conditions 
The year 2007 might not be an appropriate dividing point of pre- and post-GFC, 
as some signals of banking distress and financial crisis have already been reflected in 
2006 although auditors may or may not notice them. We also want to clarify if the 
audit fee determination changes with the macro-economic conditions other than the 
great GFC. Therefore, we introduce DFININDEX, the changes in NYSE financial 
sector index as a measure of the macro-economic condition of the banking industry in 
the model.  
As shown in Figure 3, NYSE Financial Index has kept on increasing from 5148 
in the year 2003 to the peak of 10745 in the year 2007. Afterwards, NYSE Financial 
Index has been on a downward trend and decreased to 9395 in the year 2008. 
Accordingly, the annual changes of NYSE Financial Index are positive for the 
pre-GFC years from 2003 to 2006, but negative for the post-GFC period 2007 and 
                                                
9
 The results can basically evidence the consistent pattern on the impacts of asset securitizations on audit pricing 
to credit risks. However, maybe due to the high multicollinearity existed among the interaction terms, some 




Table 7 demonstrates that audit fees are sensitive to the changes in economic 
conditions. Other things being equal, LNAF is negatively associated with 
DFININDEX (p<.0001). Stated differently, audit fees decrease in booming years but 
increase in recession periods. The association between audit fees and securitization 
factors holds robust after adding DFININDEX into the model. Specifically, SA and RI 
are still not associated with LNAF for the period 2003-2008. Additionally, 
RI*DFININDEX is negatively related to LNAF (p=0.032), indicating that with the 
decrease of NYSE Financial Sector Index, the audit pricing to the retained interests 
increases significantly.  
Partitioning the all BHC sample into pre- and post-GFC subsamples, SA and RI 
are not significant to LNAF in the pre-GFC period; while audit pricing to RI is 
positively significant after GFC (Coef. 7.39, p=0.020).  It is interesting to notice that 
LNAF is negatively associated with DFININDEX before GFC (Coef. -2.30, p<.0001) 
but positively associated with DFININDEX after GFC (Coef. 0.20, p=0.022). 
Although audit fees are lower in booming years before GFC, after GFC, auditors 
make more audit efforts and charge higher fees to BHCs even though the industry 
index shows some booming signals. 
<Table 7> 
6.2 Controlling for Auditor Change or Auditor Independence 
The addition of auditor change indicator or auditor ndependence measure into 
the regression does not affect the main test results. Specifically, AUDITORCHANGE 
is not a significant factor for BHC audit fee determination, both before and after GFC. 
For the full test period 2003-2008, none of the securitization factors is associated with 
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LNAF. There is a great increase in audit fees after GFC (p<0.0001) and audit pricing 
to retained interests has also significantly increased after GFC (RI*PGFC: Coef. 9.23, 
p=0.030). By partitioning pre- and post-GFC subsamples, although RI is not 
associated with LNAF during the pre-GFC years, LNAF is positively associated with 
RI in the post-GFC period (Coef. 7.53, p=0.019), consistent with the main test results. 
The auditor independence measure, LNNAF, is positively associated with LNAF, 
indicating that non-audit service fees are increasing with the increase of audit fees. In 
accordance with Hay et al. (2006), we explain the positive association between 
LNNAF and LNAF as non-audit services may lead to extensive changes in BHCs and 
therefore require additional audit efforts and higher audit fees. Controlling for 
non-audit service fees does not affect the main test results.  
<Table 8> 
6.3 Matched Pair Samples and the Securitizer Subsample 
We match a control group of 248 BHCs without asset ecuritization activities to 
the group of 248 BHCs having asset securitization activities from 2003 to 2008, based 
on the total asset (LNTA) and year (YEAR) measures. The matching procedure is: (1) 
For each study case, control cases are matched on LNTA (the BHC size measure) and 
Year (the year measure); and (2) If more than one control cases match the study case, 
one control case is randomly selected. The final matched pair sample consists of 496 
firm-year observations from 2003 to 2008. As shown in Table 9 Panel A, the results 
are qualitatively similar to the main analysis results. Although asset securitization 
factors are not associated with LNAF for the study period from 2003 through 2008, 
the interaction term RI*PGFC is positively significant, indicating that audit pricing to 
the retained interests is increased after GFC.  
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The securitizer subsample has 274 BHC-year observations. Unreported 
descriptive statistics indicate that the securitizer subsample has much higher audit fees 
(LNAF) and larger BHC size (LNTA). They are more audited by Big N auditors (Big 
N), have lower stock price volatility (STDRET), higer level of loan-charge-off 
(CHGOFF), and higher level of intangible assets (INTA G). Securitizers are more 
involved in on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet in erest rate risks 
(SENSITIVE*∆INT and INTDERIV).  Not strangely, the securitizer subsample is 
more actively involved into asset securitization transactions than the all-BHC sample. 
Table 9 Panel B report the regression results on the securitizer subsample. Consistent 
with the main test results, the audit pricing to RI has a great increase after GFC 
(RI*PGFC Coef.9.04, p-value 0.043). Inconsistent with the main results, none of the 
asset securitization factors is significantly associated with LNAF, either before or 
after GFC. We attribute the insignificant results to the limited securitizer subsample 
size (N=274, compared with a large audit fee model with around 20 independent 
variables and interaction terms) and the very small post-GFC securitizer subsample 
size (N=73). 
<Table 9> 
6.4 Excluding the Year 2006 
It might be inappropriate to include the year 2006 as a pre-GFC year, as this year 
may have seen some signals of banking distress and financial crisis and auditors may 
have been affected by them in audit pricing accordingly. Therefore we exclude the 
year 2006 from the pooled sample and rerun the regressions. As shown in Table 10, 




6.5 Audit Fees and Asset Securitizations by Auditor Size and by BHC Size 
The main tests suggest that auditor choice is an important factor affecting audit 
fee determination. Untabulated descriptive statistics indicate that audit fees and total 
asset values are much higher for Big 4 Clients than for Non-Big 4 clients. Big 4 
clients also have higher securitization amounts. Comparing the financial risk factors, 
Big 4 clients have lower possibility of incurring a loss (LOSS) and lower market risk 
(STDRET), implying that Big 4 clients are usually under lower business risks. We test 
whether THE auditors’ pricing to asset securitization factors differentiate between Big 
N auditors and non-Big N auditors. Table 11 Panel A indicates that Big N and non-Big 
N auditors both increase audit fees after GFC; but only Big N auditors marginally 
increase their audit pricing to one of the asset securitization risks after GFC 
(RI*PGFC Coef. 7.60, p-value 0.079), which is supported by a marginally significant 
association between LNAF and RI for the Big-N auditor subsample (RI; coef. 6.28, 
p-value 0.056). The results from the analysis by auditor choice suggest that Big N 
auditors probably have better awareness of asset securitization risks, even though Big 
N auditors’ attention to asset securitizations still lies in the retained interest 
components, and only after GFC. 
We also test whether the association between LNAF and asset securitizations is 
different for large BHCs and small BHCs. Table 2 indicates that asset securitization 
activities are clustered in large BHCs. Untabulated descriptive comparison 
demonstrates that large BHCs have higher audit fees and more asset securitization 
activities. Large BHCs are more likely to employ Big N auditors, incur a loss, and 
have a higher charge-off rate, a higher intangible asset ratio and a higher 
interest-sensitive asset ratio than small BHCs. Table 11 Panel B suggests that the main 
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test results hold consistent for the large BHCs. However, for the non-Big N subsample, 
as all the RIs are 0 in the post-GFC years, we cannot give out a comparable result on 
RI from the non-Big N subsample. On the other hand, the high multicollinearity 
existed among asset securitization variables and interaction terms veils the true effect 
of BHC size on the association between LNAF and asset securitizations.  
<Table 11> 
7 Conclusion 
This study presents a cross-sectional and intertemporal icture of the association 
between audit fees and asset securitization from the pricing perspective. Although 
asset securitization has been studied in different aspects, no prior study has focused on 
the auditor’s role in asset securitization. The current financial crisis reveals the 
economic materiality and the impact of asset securitization on the economy, financial 
markets and individual firms. For auditors, asset securitization is an important audit 
area with great audit risk and economic materiality. 
The main tests and additional analyses are consistet on the association between 
audit fees and asset securitization factors in several dimensions. First, pooled for the 
period from 2003 to 2008, no asset securitization factors are priced in audit fees. 
Second, intertemporally comparing the before and after GFC results, SA, RI and GOS 
are not related to AF before GFC; after GFC, asset ecuritization risks have been 
priced by auditors in audit fees but only focused on the retained interest portion.  
The results well explain the central question that “where were the auditors in 
asset securitization” under the lens of audit pricing. For the study period, auditors 
only focused on the risks associated with the retain d portion of the securitized assets 
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(RI) in their audits and only after GFC. Auditors believed that the risk of asset 
securitization rested with the retained portion of the securitized assets, supporting the 
sale of assets treatment, and consistent with the views of regulators and standard 
setters. However, a series of bank distresses and filures across the GFC have 
demonstrated that it would be more conservative and optimal to fully consider the 
risks associated with total securitized assets and t ke securitization activities as 
secured borrowings. Therefore the risks associated with the total securitized assets 
(SA) had been largely neglected by auditors for the study period. In addition, the 
before-and-after comparison indicates that, even for the risks associated with the 
retained interest portion, auditors did not capture it before the GFC but only after 
2006 when the impact and risks of asset securitization o the GFC has been 
universally disclosed and recognized.  
A series of additional analyses and sensitivity tests support the main test results 
on the association between asset securitizations and audit fees. In addition, we find 
that off-balance-sheet risks are also priced in audit fees; and the macroeconomic 
condition and non-audit service fees are important determinants of audit fees. By 
comparing the audit pricing to asset securitization risks for BHCs audited by Big N 
and non-Big N auditors, we find inconclusive signals that Big N auditors are superior 
in capturing asset securitization risks to non-Big N auditors. By splitting the pooled 
sample into large and small BHC subsamples, the regression results on large BHCs 
also support the main test results.  
This overall study contributes to the limitedly developed bank audit literature. 
With the lens of audit pricing, it provides insights on auditors’ behaviours around the 
financial crisis, particularly focusing on asset securitization. The relatively stable 
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regulatory and accounting standard environment during the study period creates an 
ideal situation to examine the inter-temporal variation of any association between 
audit fees and asset securitization under a changing economic environment from 
prosperity to recession. By addressing bank auditing and asset securitization, it relates 
to several points mentioned in Basel (2008) including consolidation, fair value 
estimation and disclosures of off-balance-sheet vehicles. The findings that auditors 
cannot capture asset securitization risks before the GFC and auditors could only focus 
on risks associated with the retained portion of the securitized assets after the GFC 
well explain the audit failures on asset securitization area in recent years, and might 
be theoretically and practically useful for regulators, standard setters and the audit 
profession.   
The study has several limitations. First, due to the data availability, our study 
only covers the years from 2003 to 2008. In the pre- and post-GFC comparison, there 
are only 4 years’ pre-GFC data and 2 years’ post-GFC data. The short time span and 
the unbalanced data structure might be one reason for some insignificant results in 
this study. Second, due to the limitation of empirical research methods, we cannot 
further analyse the reasons behind the lack of focus on asset securitization risks by 
auditors, especially before the GFC. We hope experimental and behavioural research 
could further precede this topic. Third, this study only analyses the cost-side of the 
association between audit pricing and asset securitization. Whether and how this fee 
premium in asset securitization is beneficial, e.g.in reporting quality and audit quality, 




Appendix 1: Accounting Treatments on Asset Securitizations 




Servicing asset  40 
Interest-only strip 
receivables 
  60 
FAS 140 before Revision FAS 156 FAS 166 
Carrying amounts based on the relative fair values Carrying amounts based on the relative fair value Net Proceeds 
 Fair 
value 










   
Loans sold 1000 91% 910 Loans sold 1040 94.55 945.5 Cash proceeds 1000  
Servicing asset 40 3.6 36     servicing assets 40  
Interest-only strip 
receivables 
60 5.4 54 Interest-only strip 
receivables 
60 5.45 54.5 Interest-only strip 
receivables 
60  
Total 1100 100 1000 Total  1100 100 1000 Net proceeds 1100  
Gains on sale     Gains on sale    Gains on sale   
Net proceeds $ 1000   Net proceeds $ 1040  Net proceeds 1100  
Carrying amount of 
loans sold 
 910   Carrying amount of 
loans sold 
 945.5  less: carrying 
amount of loan sold 
1000  
Gains on sale   90   Gains on sale   94.5  Gains on sale 100  
Journal entry:    Journal entry:    Journal entry:   
Cash 1000   Cash 1000    Cash 1000  
    Loan sold  910  Interest-only strip 
receivables 
54.5    Interest-only strip 60  
    Gains on sale  90  servicing asset 40    Servicing asset 40  
        Loans sold  1000       Loan sold  1000 
Servicing asset 36   Gains on sale  94.5       Gains on sale   100 
Interest-only strip 
receivables 
54          
    Loans sold  90  Interest-only strip 
receivables 
5.5      
Interest-only strip* 6   Other    
comprehensive 
  5.5     
    Equity   6         
Note: as required in FAS 166 and FAS 167, the concept of QSPE was deleted. In most situations, the SPEfinancial report should be consolidated with the transferor's report. Therefore, there is no effect of sale 
accounting to the consolidated reports. * According to FAS 115, interest-only strip receivables are subsequently classified as available-for-sale securities and its changes in fair values should be adjusted and reported 




Panel B: Comparison of Sale accounting and Borrowing Accounting 
 
(1) We assume that Bank A initially has loan assets of $4,000, consisting of 
half of its total assets. As a bank meeting the capital requirements, Its owner's equity 
is $640, 8% of total assets. Its ROI before the securitization is 10% (the example case 
is established based on the statistics from our 2006 BHC data). 
 (3) Bank A securitizes 25% of the loans via a QSPE (after FAS 156), 
qualifying a sale accounting according to FAS140 and FAS 156. 
Initial Balance Sheet leverage(D/E ratio): 11.5  The balance sheet after the securitization 
Other assets 
$4,




























servicing asset $40    
      Interest-only strip  $60    
(2) Bank A securitizes 25% of the loans via a QSPE (Before FAS 156); the 
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The income statement after the securitization 
Loans 
$3,
000    
 net income other 
than securitization $64    
servicing asset $36    
 Gains on 
securitization $95    
Interest-only strip  $60    
 other 
comprehensive income $6    
Other assets 
$4,















(4) The transaction in (2) and (3) are recorded as a secured borrowing. 
The income statement after the securitization  The balance sheet after the securitization leverage: 13.06 
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$
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$3,
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$4,
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total assets 
$9,
000   
liabiliti
es & equity $9,000 
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Figure 2 The Overview of the Sample 
 
  
The pooled sample 2003-2008 
2,136 BHC-year observations 
(100%) 
Securitizers with RI=0 
96 BHC-year 
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BHCs with RI (SA>0 & 
RI>0) 










Figure 3 The Plots of Selected Variables 
   
      
      


















































































Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Pooled 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Dependent Variable 
AUDIT_FEES $ Mean 1,210,067.74 685,440.01 1,050,175.96 1,198,512.37 1,441,411.00 1,511,708.32 1,654,42.2  
 Median 268,446.50 144,500.00 247,080.00 280,000.00 332,000.00 353,301.00 380,000.00 
Control Variables 
TA $ Mean 25,316,446,010 16,549,493,540 19,311,922,010 21,337,121,080 29,351,957,690 34,610,684,810 38,08 ,226,760 
 Median 1,584,543,500 1,093,238,000 1,223,803,000 1,452,287,000 1,971,753,000 2,109,270,000 2,271,833,000 
BIGN Mean 0.499 0.573 0.531 0.483 0.486 0.450 0.428 
 Median 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
LOSS Mean 0.059 0.009 0.024 0.018 0.012 0.060 0.289 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
STDRET Mean 0.326 0.337 0.362 0.371 0.281 0.265 0.313 
 Median 0.041 0.029 0.035 0.028 0.021 0.026 0.067 
TRANSACCT Mean 0.570 0.596 0.600 0.578 0.552 0.548 0.516 
 Median 0.573 0.609 0.611 0.581 0.551 0.543 0.517 
SECURITIES Mean 0.206 0.244 0.227 0.207 0.190 0.173 0.174 
 Median 0.184 0.228 0.210 0.190 0.168 0.157 0.156 
EFFICIENCY Mean 0.656 0.637 0.644 0.630 0.632 0.659 0.766 
 Median 0.636 0.630 0.633 0.619 0.625 0.647 0.673 
COMMLOAN Mean 0.168 0.175 0.167 0.160 0.166 0.169 0.168 
 Median 0.150 0.158 0.148 0.141 0.150 0.154 0.150 
NONPERFORM Mean 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.028 
 Median 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.020 
CHGOFF Mean 0.277 0.272 0.236 0.211 0.215 0.281 0.505 
 Median 0.200 0.216 0.174 0.141 0.156 0.219 0.409 
MTGLOAN Mean 0.734 0.715 0.731 0.745 0.373 0.741 0.744 
 Median 0.758 0.739 0.752 0.765 0.767 0.767 0.775 
CAPRATIO Mean 13.534 14.062 13.801 13.586 13.393 12.680 13.353 
 Median 12.710 13.225 12.910 12.660 12.510 11.785 13.070 
INTANG Mean 0.018 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.024 0.02  
 Median 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.018 0.014 
SAVING Mean 0.056 0.071 0.064 0.064 0.046 0.040 0.039 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SENSITIVE Mean 0.095 0.086 0.137 0.118 0.079 0.072 0.056 
 Median 0.090 0.089 0.135 0.114 0.073 0.067 0.047 
∆INT Mean 0.006 -0.250 1.250 2.000 1.000 -1.000 -4.250 
 Median - - - - - - - 
INTDERIV Mean 0.269 0.259 0.227 0.238 0.302 0.319 0.298 




  Pooled 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Asset Securitization Variables 
SA AMOUNT Mean 4,691,652,460 2,347,636,000 2,956,949,710 3,791,364,130 5,846,183,690 5,585,318,500 9,664,898,200 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RI AMOUNT Mean 89,764,370 73,426,240 67,016,150 70,296 080 107,100,610 113,798,700 128,384,770 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GOS AMOUNT Mean 45,741,650 38,488,640 46,294,460 36,273,510 58,240,880 56,914,200 42,516,240 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SA (RATIO) Mean 0.023 0.040 0.022 0.019 0.024 0.013 0.015 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RI Mean 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GOS Mean -0.012 0.013 0.017 0.010 0.015 0.014 -0.178 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Additional Information 
Interest Rate  2.910 (Mean) 1.240 0.890 3.620 4.940 4.530 1.830 
NYSE Fin Index  8,157.60 (Mean) 5,148.45 6,874.44 7,889.40 8,893.39 10,745.00 9,394.92 
DFININDEX  0.063(Mean) 0.335 0.154 0.105 0.202 -0.111 -0.515 
 




Table 2 the distribution of Asset Securitization Variables 
Panel A:  





y (%) GOS 
Frequency 
(%) 
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  274 
(12.83%) >0 
178   
(8.33%) >0 
120   
(4.92%) 
 





    
97,704,166 
 
(2) In the largest BHC sample (n=300, Total assets >$11,680 Million) 
SA 
Frequenc
y (%) RI 
Frequenc
y (%) GOS 
Frequency 
(%) 





















   
97,637,827 
 
Panel B. Top 50 Securitizers during the Period 2003-2008    
BHC Name Frequency of Being Listed in Top 50 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP 6 
CITIGROUP INC.                             6 
J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO.    6 
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY                        6 
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.                        6 
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 5 
WACHOVIA CORPORATION*                     5 
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP* 4 
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORPORATION        3 
MBNA CORPORATION*  2 
BANK ONE CORP*  1 
* Wachovia Corporation was purchased by Wells Fargo t the end of 2008 in a government-forced sale to avoid the failure of Wachovia. 
* Countrywide Financial was purchased by Bank of America in 2008. 
* Bank One merged with JPMorgan Chase & Co. on July1, 2004 
* MBNA was acquired by Bank of America at the end of 2005.(* Sources: WiKipedia) 
52 
 
Table 3: Correlations 
 LNAF LNTA BIGN LOSS STDR TRAN SECU EFFI COMM NONP CHGO MTGL CAPR INTA SAVI SENS S*∆INT INTD DFIN SA RI 
LNTA 0.911 1                        
  <.0001                          
BIGN 0.585  0.540 1                   
  <.0001 <.0001                    
LOSS 0.070 0.016 -0.033 1                      
  0.001 0.451  0.125                       
STDRET -0.616 -0.656 -0.448 -0.040 1                 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0629                  
TRANSACCT 0.111 0.119 0.205 -0.190 -0.157 1                 
  <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001                   
SECURITIES -0.000 0.026 0.194 -0.121 0.007 0.131 1               
  0.993 0.231 <.0001 <.0001 0.749 <.0001                
EFFICIENCY -0.041 -0.144 -0.102 0.532 0.200 -0.064 -0.043 1               
  0.061 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.003 0.046                
COMMLOAN 0.172  0.161 0.194 -0.056 -0.168 0.261 -0.036 -0.029 1             
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.010 <.0001 <.0001 0.093 0.188              
NONPERFORM 0.131  0.078 -0.043 0.484 -0.020 -0.295 -0.122 0.266 -0.012 1            
  <.0001 0.000 0.047 <.0001 0.353 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.569             
CHGOFF 0.272 0.239 0.072 0.370 -0.131 -0.139 -0.096 0.205 0.088 0.497 1           
  <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001            
MTGLOAN -0.428  -0.426 -0.335 0.078 0.259 -0.234 -0.124 0.016 -0.675 0.035 -0.265 1          
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.457 <.0001 0.105 <.0001           
CAPRATIO -0.111 -0.142 -0.008 -0.044 0.141 0.024 0.437 -0.017 -0.122 -0.024 0.030 -0.037 1         
  <.0001 <.0001 0.699 0.044 <.0001 0.271 <.0001 0.431 <.0001 0.262 0.172 0.091          
INTANG 0.452  0.444 0.233 -0.030 -0.343 0.136 -0.124 -0.062 0.039 0.013 0.109 -0.123 -0.112 1        
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.160 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.004 0.072 0.539 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001         
SAVING -0.086 -0.089 -0.038 0.000 0.115 -0.029 -0.037 0.030 -0.132 -0.008 -0.046 0.187 0.064 0.064 1       
 <.0001 <.0001 0.078 0.988 <.0001 0.175 0.084 0.160 <.0001 0.726 0.035 <.0001 0.003 0.003        
SENSITIVE 0.227 0.242 0.185 -0.051 -0.191 0.331 -0.156 -0.098 0.265 -0.097 -0.011 -0.254 -0.051 0.068 -0.067 1      
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.018 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.608 <.0001 0.020 0.002 0.002       
SENSITIVE*∆INT -0.043 -0.053 -0.027 -0.130 0.023 0.021 -0.009 -0.082 -0.046 -0.198 -0.138 0.039 -0.045 -0.012 -0.005 0.089 1     
 0.045 0.014 0.215 <.0001 0.296 0.322 0.684 0.000 0.034 <.0001 <.0001 0.075 0.037 0.569 0.812 <.0001      
INTDERIV 0.504 0.507 0.177 -0.001 -0.149 -0.013 -0.089 -0.019 0.056 0.100 0.176 -0.206 -0.046 0.203 -0.001 0.095 -0.016 1    
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.840 <.0001 0.556 <.0001 0.374 0.010 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.033 <.0001 0.962 <.0001 0.466     
DFININDEX -0.178 -0.112 0.083 -0.363 0.034 0.161 0.174 -0.205 0.009 -0.461 -0.281 -0.046 0.104 -0.101 0.041 0.095 0.269 0.001 1   
 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 0.117 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.673 <.0001 <.0001 0.033 <.0001 <.0001 0.056 <.0001 <.0001 0.974    
SA 0.164 0.163 0.053 0.007 -0.055 -0.010 -0.041 -0.002 -0.070 0.078 0.117 -0.018 0.082 0.174 0.062 0.054 -0.008 0.238 0.032 1  
  <.0001 <.0001 0.015 0.745 0.011 0.660 0.060 0.938 0.001 0.000 <.0001 0.395 0.000 <.0001 0.004 0.012 0.700 <.0001 0.144   
RI  0.222 0.225 0.120 0.052 -0.095 -0.071 0.013 -0.052 -0.044 0.118 0.173 -0.126 0.101 0.105 -0.009 0.041 -0.013 0.206 0.021 0.277 1 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.017 <.0001 0.001 0.543 0.016 0.043 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.694 0.059 0.549 <.0001 0.329 <.0001  
GOS -0.021 -0.030 -0.012 -0.090 0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.033 0.043 -0.021 -0.046 0.013 -0.001 0.036 0.033 0.050 0.022 -0.009 
  0.325 0.172 0.595 <.0001 0.779 0.874 0.790 0.834 0.844 0.870 0.129 0.045 0.332 0.034 0.536 0.961 0.097 0.128 0.022 0.307 0.684 
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Table 4 the Validity of the Basic Model, Based on the Pooled Sample and Yearly Sample 
 Fields et al. (2004)  Pooled 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Variable Sign p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Intercept + <0.01 -4.10  <.0001 -4.15 <.0001 -3.45 <.0001 -4.64*** -3.02*** -2.84*** -2.96*** -1.41** -2.25** * 
LNTA + <0.01 0.64 <.0001 0.64 <.0001 0.59 <.0001 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 
BIGN + <0.01 0.37 <.0001 0.37 <.0001 0.39 <.0001 0.35*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
LOSS + >0.10 -0.08 0.087 -0.08 0.102 -0.05 0.215 -0.47** -0.25* -0.15 -0.16 0.18* -0.02 
STDRET + >0.10 -0.09 0.007 -0.09 0.007 -0.16 <.0001 0.02 -0.47*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.20** -0.12 
TRANSACCT + <0.05 -0.06 0.214 -0.05 0.243 -0.04 0.298 0.26* 0.19 0.03 -0.05 -0.28* -0.14 
SECURITIES + <0.01 -0.59 <.0001 -0.59 <.0001 -0.49 <.0001 -0.68*** -0.40** -0.23 -0.14 0.47* 0.12 
EFFICIENCY + <0.01 0.78 <.0001 0.78 <.0001 0.75 <.0001 1.12*** 1.15*** 1.01*** 0.87*** 0.61*** 0.31** 
COMMLOAN + <0.01 -0.21 0.097 -0.18 0.124 -0.20 0.099 -0.07 -0.17 -0.40 -0.20 -0.45 -0.40 
NONPERFORM + <0.01 5.08 <.0001 5.47 <.0001 5.19 <.0001 5.22** 5.75** 11.11*** 2.85 -0.32 5.68*** 
CHGOFF + <0.10 0.05 0.180 0.05 0.163 0.04 0.216 0.39*** 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.20* -0.00 
MTGLOAN + <0.05 -0.38 0.001 -0.38 0.001 -0.39 0.000 -0.13 -0.31* -0.41** -0.43* -0.70** -0.64** 
CAPRATIO + <0.05 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.01 0.001 0.03*** 0.02** 0.01 0.03*** -0.01 0.02** 
INTANG + <0.01 3.85 <.0001 3.83 <.0001 3.98 <.0001 3.44** 4.20*** 3.47*** 1.33 1.95* 0.40 
SAVING + <0.05 -0.06 0.092 -0.06 0.096 -0.07 0.065 0.01 -0.06 -0.14* 0.04 0.05 0.06 
SENSITIVE - >0.10 0.02 0.403           
SENS* ∆INT     0.09 0.003 0.08 0.005 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.20* -0.34** -0.04 
INTDERIV       0.15 <.0001 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
                
CHOW TEST   F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value       
   4.19 <.0001 6.43 <.0001 7.38 <.0001       
N 277   2136  2136  2136  424 409 391 329 300 283 
Adj. R-square  0.877    0.859  0.860  0.863  0.861 0.892 0.890 0.890 0.882 0.880 
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
The Chow Tests indicate the difference of the model structure before and after GFC with the break point as 2007. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test).  
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Table 5: Audit Fees and Asset Securitizations, for the Pooled Sample, Pre-GFC and Post-GFC Samples, and the Yearly Samples 
 
 
                                                                                                                            (2) 
 
 
 Pooled Before GFC After GFC 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
SENS* ∆INT 0.08 0.005 0.14 <.0001 0.13 <.0001 0.36 <.0001 -0.06 0.099 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.20 -0.35** -0.04 
INTDERIV 0.15 <.0001 0.16 <.0001 0.17 <.0001 0.14 <.0001 0.26 <.0001 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 
                 
SA -0.03 0.294   0.01 0.455 -0.01 0.411 -0.30 0.154 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.05 -0.74** -0.30 
RI 1.11 0.317   -0.98 0.362 -0.32 0.459 7.70 0.017 5.22 1.06 4.43 2.53 3.62 8.35** 
GOS 0.00 0.319   0.01 0.283 -0.02 0.440 0.00 0.295 -0.20 -0.01 -0.21 0.02 0.19 0.00 
 PGFC   0.16 <.0001 0.16 <.0001           
SA*PGFC     -0.34 0.129           
RI*PGFC     9.22 0.030           
                 
CHOW TEST F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value           
 6.45 <.0001 5.01 <.0001 4.12 <.0001           
                 
N 2136      1553  583  424 409 391 329 300 283 
Adj. R-square  0.863  0.865  0.865  0.862  0.880  0.860 0.891 0.890 0.889 0.882 0.880 
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
The Chow Tests indicate the difference of the model structure before and after GFC with the break point as 2007. 




















Table 6: The Impact of Asset Securitization on Audit Pricing to Credit Risks and Market Risks 
 
 Asset Structure Asset Quality 
Audit Pricing to Asset Structure 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
SA 0.00 0.477 0.01 0.411 -0.73 0.082 -0.05 0.466 -0.10 0.358 0.31 0.149 -0.03 0.365 -0.06 0.231 0.05 0.392 0.02 0.456 
RI -0.59 0.444 0.48 0.454 14.51 0.079 2.39 0.424 1.93 0.333 -3.99 0.210 -3.71 0.249 4.57 0.268 -6.51 0.133 -5.43 0.180 
GOS 0.00 0.327 0.01 0.263 0.00 0.333 0.00 0.302 0.00 0.320 0.01 0.175 0.00 0.323 0.01 0.290 0.00 0.345 0.01 0.267 
PGFC   0.16 <.0001   0.17 <.0001   0.16 <.0001   0.17 <.0001   0.16 <.0001 
SA*COMMLOAN -1.61 0.073 -0.81 0.288                 
RI*COMMLOAN 19.74 0.254 -13.06 0.352                 
SA*COMM*PGFC   -0.78 0.341                 
RI*COMM*PGFC   60.10 0.036                 
SA*MTGLOAN1     0.77 0.090 0.07 0.462             
RI*MTGLOAN     -18.37 0.099 -4.57 0.388             
SA*MTGLOAN*PGFC       -0.63 0.129             
RI*MTGLOAN*PGFC       12.52 0.083             
SA*INTANG2         1.08 0.394 -4.37 0.153         
RI*INTANG         -19.46 0.438 32.75 0.396         
SA*INTANG*PGFC           -13.28 0.036         
RI*INTANG*PGFC           533.46 0.003         
SA*NONPERFORM             0.07 0.494 4.86 0.156     
RI*NONPERFORM             166.77 0.169 -251.70 0.220     
SA*NONP*PGFC               -7.87 0.190     
RI*NONP*PGFC               304.69 0.073     
SA*CHGOFF                 -0.14 0.327 -0.04 0.454 
RI*CHGOFF                 10.94 0.090 6.45 0.225 
SA*CHGOFF*PGFC                   -0.17 0.361 
RI*CHGOFF*PGFC                   10.76 0.047 
1. High VIFs on SA, RI and SA*MTGLOAN (over 20). 
2. VIFs of SA and SA*INTANG are larger than 35. 




Table 7: Additional Analysis by Controlling for Changes in NYSE Financial Index 
 
 Pooled BEFORE GFC AFTER GFC 
Variable Coef. t-Stat. p-value Coef. t-Stat. p-value Coef. t-Stat. p-value Coef. t-Stat. p-value Coef. t-Stat. p-value Coef. t-Stat. p-value 
SENSITIVE* ∆INT 0.14 4.64 <.0001 0.14 4.62 <.0001 0.15 4.68 <.0001 0.12 3.66 0.000 0.02 0.34 0.369 -0.07 -1.55 0.061 
INTDERIV 0.18 8.84 <.0001 0.18 8.59 <.0001 0.18 8.48 <.0001 0.18 8.70 <.0001 0.15 6.71 <.0001 0.26 6.95 <.0001 
DFININDEX -0.47 -9.89 <.0001 -0.48 -9.96 <.0001 -0.47 -9.79 <.0001 -0.72 -8.74 <.0001 -2.30 -15.83 <.0001 0.20 2.01 0.022 
SA    0.00 0.09 0.463 0.03 0.28 0.389 0.02 0.40 0.346 0.02 0.42 0.336 -0.33 -1.13 0.130 
RI    2.76 1.22 0.112 3.29 1.42 0.078 -0.00 -0.00 0.50  0.81 0.28 0.391 7.39 2.05 0.020 
GOS    0.01 0.69 0.245 0.01 0.93 0.176 0.01 0.76 0.223 -0.06 -0.53 0.298 0.00 0.48 0.316 
SA*DFININDEX       -0.07 -0.18 0.428          
RI*DFININDEX       -13.58 -1.85 0.032          
PGFC           -0.17 -3.65 0.000       
SA*PGFC          -0.30 -1.02 0.153       
RI*PGFC          9.10 1.89 0.029       
                   
CHOW TEST  F-Stat p-value  F-Stat p-value  F-Stat p-value  F-Stat p-value       
  16.44 <.0001  14.21 <.0001  12.82 <.0001  12.03 <.0001       
                   
N 2136            1553   583   






Table 8 Additional Analysis by Controlling for Audi tor Changes and Non-Audit Service Fees  
 
 Pooled  Before GFC After GFC 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
 
Panel A: Controlling for auditor changes 
SENSITIVE*∆INT 0.08 0.004 0.08 0.005 0.14 <.0001 0.36 <.0001 -0.05 0.109 
INTDERIV 0.15 <.0001 0.15 <.0001 0.17 <.0001 0.14 <.0001 0.26 <.0001 
AUDITORCHANGE -0.05 0.113 -0.05 0.113 -0.03 0.202 -0.01 0.406 -0.12 0.066 
SA   -0.03 0.292 0.01 0.458 -0.01 0.409 -0.27 0.177 
RI   1.06 0.323 -1.01 0.357 -0.34 0.457 7.53 0.019 
GOS   0.00 0.317 0.01 0.281 -0.02 0.442 0.00 0.289 
PGFC     0.16 <.0001     
SA*PGFC     -0.33 0.134     
RI*PGFC     9.23 0.030     
           
CHOW TEST F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value     
 7.00 <.0001 6.16 <.0001 4.05 <.0001     
            
N 2136      1553  583  
Adj. R-square  0.863  0.863  0.865  0.862  0.880  
 
Panel B: Controlling for non-audit service fees 
SENSITIVE* ∆INT 0.08 0.008 0.07 0.008 0.13 <.0001 0.36 <.0001 -0.06 0.095 
INTDERIV 0.14 <.0001 0.14 <.0001 0.16 <.0001 0.13 <.0001 0.25 <.0001 
LNNAF 0.02 0.003 0.02 0.003 0.03 0.000 0.03 0.008 0.03 0.007 
SA   -0.03 0.305 0.01 0.427 -0.01 0.433 -0.31 0.148 
RI   0.80 0.364 -1.18 0.335 -0.52 0.434 7.16 0.023 
GOS   0.00 0.324 0.01 0.292 -0.02 0.443 0.00 0.310 
PGFC      0.18 <.0001     
SA*PGFC     -0.35 0.115     
RI*PGFC     8.85 0.035     
           
CHOW TEST F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value     
 7.20 <.0001 6.32 <.0001 3.91 <.0001     
           
N 2136      1553  583  
Adj. R-square  0.864  0.863  0.866  0.863  0.881  
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Table 9 Additional Tests: Matched Pair Sample and the Securitizer Subsample 
 
  Before GFC After GFC 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
 
Panel A Matched Pair Sample (Ncontrol=248, Nstudy=248) 
SENS*∆INT 0.14 0.014 0.24 0.000 0.23 0.000 0.47 <.0001 0.09 0.196 
INTDERIV 0.14 <.0001 0.15 <.0001 0.15 <.0001 0.13 <.0001 0.24 <.0001 
SA -0.03 0.321 -0.01 0.416 0.00 0.486 -0.03 0.330 -0.41 0.114 
RI -0.03 0.495 0.46 0.372 -2.08 0.263 0.79 0.417 6.29 0.104 
GOS 0.01 0.279 0.01 0.279 0.01 0.263 -0.00 0.489 0.01 0.153 
 PGFC   0.19 0.001 0.19 0.001     
SA*PGFC     -0.33 0.155     
RI*PGFC     11.05 0.037     
           
CHOW TEST F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value     
 2.96 <.0001 2.35 0.000 2.02 0.002     
           
N 496      347  149  
Adj. R-square  0.887  0.889  0.889  0.891  0.903  
 
Panel B The Securitizer Subsample 
SENS* ∆INT 0.28 0.001 0.38 <.0001 0.37 0.000 0.59 0.000 -0.08 0.328 
INTDERIV 0.18 <.0001 0.19 <.0001 0.19 <.0001 0.16 <.0001 0.28 <.0001 
SA -0.03 0.300 -0.02 0.403 -0.00 0.495 -0.02 0.364 -0.27 0.228 
RI -2.26 0.188 -1.61 0.262 -4.83 0.063 -1.92 0.289 2.37 0.287 
GOS 0.01 0.123 0.01 0.123 0.01 0.139 -0.07 0.297 0.02 0.070 
 PGFC   0.22 0.006 0.24 0.006     
SA*PGFC     -0.44 0.094     
RI*PGFC     9.04 0.043     
           
CHOW TEST F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value     
 1.96 0.005 1.55 0.032 1.30 0.083     
           
N 274      201  73  





Table 10 Robust Test: Excluding the Year 2006 from the Sample 
 
Variable ALL BHCs EXCLUDING 
2006 DATA 
Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
 Coef. t-Stat. p-value Coef. t-Stat. p-value Coef. t-Stat. p-value 
Intercept -3.28 -11.18 <.0001 -3.78 -10.14 <.0001 -1.67 -3.54 0.000 
LNTA 0.58 41.97 <.0001 0.58 33.33 <.0001 0.53 23.96 <.0001 
BIGN 0.42 14.80 <.0001 0.43 12.19 <.0001 0.40 9.00 <.0001 
LOSS -0.06 -0.99 0.161 -0.18 -1.36 0.087 0.03 0.43 0.334 
STDRET 0.14 -3.45 0.000 -0.18 -3.32 0.000 -0.16 -2.42 0.008 
TRANSACCT 0.06 0.70 0.242 -0.01 -0.11 0.458 -0.14 -0.92 0.178 
SECURITIES -0.43 -3.65 0.000 -0.43 -2.99 0.001 0.16 0.75 0.226 
EFFICIENCY 0.69 7.36 <.0001 1.10 7.88 <.0001 0.35 2.96 0.002 
COMMLOAN -0.27 -1.59 0.056 -0.30 -1.40 0.081 -0.47 -1.64 0.05  
NONPERFORM 3.75 3.14 0.001 4.39 2.15 0.016 3.36 2.43 0.008 
CHGOFF 0.04 0.81 0.209 0.14 1.80 0.036 0.01 0.19 0.425 
MTGLOAN -0.44 -3.53 0.000 -0.19 -1.20 0.114 -0.78 -3.73 0.00  
CAPRATIO 0.01 2.91 0.002 0.01 2.36 0.009 0.00 0.44 0.331 
INTANG 3.80 5.56 <.0001 5.46 6.02 <.0001 1.39 1.44 0.075 
SAVING -0.05 -1.07 0.143 -0.09 -1.46 0.072 0.07 0.73 0.234 
SENS* ∆INT 0.15 4.41 <.0001 0.42 7.17 <.0001 -0.06 -1.29 0.099 
INTDERIV 0.17 7.46 <.0001 0.14 4.81 <.0001 0.26 7.01 <.0001 
SA 0.00 0.08 0.468 -0.02 -0.27 0.395 -0.30 -1.02 0.154 
RI -0.34 -0.11 0.455 0.84 0.24 0.407 7.70 2.14 0.017 
GOS 0.01 0.57 0.286 -0.02 -0.13 0.450 0.00 0.54 0.295 
PGFC 0.22 7.41 <.0001       
SA*PGFC -0.31 -1.01 0.156       
RI*PGFC 8.52 1.68 0.046       




 F-Stat. p-value       
 4.32 <.0001       
          
N 1807   1224   583   





Table 11 Additional Analysis by Auditor Size and by BHC Size 
 
 
Panel A by Auditor Size 
 Non-Big N Auditor Big N Auditor 
Variable  Pre-GFC Post-GFC  Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
SENS* ∆INT 0.05 0.124 0.19 0.007 -0.06 0.120 0.24 <.0001 0.49 <.0001 -0.04 0.278 
INTDERIV 0.34 0.151 0.50 0.111 -0.27 0.309 0.19 <.0001 0.16 <.0001 0.27 <.0001 
SA -0.00 0.476 -0.02 0.355 -1.47 0.087 0.09 0.216 0.04 0.371 -0.26 0.216 
RI 152.01 0.082 -227.55 0.043 -4490.57 0.291 -0.91 0.389 0.45 0.446 6.28 0.056 
PGFC 0.12 0.000     0.20 <.0001     
SA*PGFC -1.32 0.140     -0.29 0.193     
RI*PGFC -9581.24 0.145     7.60 0.079     




F-Stat. p-value     F-Stat. p-value     
2.47 0.000     6.48 <.0001     
             
N 1071  744  327  1065  809  256  
Adj. R-square  0.660  0.621  0.635  0.847  0.845  0.860  
Panel B by BHC Size 
 Small BHCs Large BHCs 
Variable  Pre-GFC Post-GFC  Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
SENS* ∆INT 0.05 0.128 0.17 0.008 -0.02 0.345 0.16 0.000 0.53 <.0001 -0.05 0.200 
INTDERIV -0.01 0.486 0.10 0.416 -0.63 0.169 0.18 <.0001 0.17 <.0001 0.25 <.0001 
SA 0.00 0.475 -0.01 0.454 -18.48 0.040 0.10 0.183 0.03 0.386 -0.29 0.179 
RI# 44.15 0.473 71.38 0.458   -1.64 0.306 1.18 0.363 7.09 0.035 
PGFC 0.17 <.0001     0.12 0.002     
SA*PGFC -17.69 0.084     -0.22 0.244     
RI*PGFC       9.79 0.033     




F-Stat. p-value     F-Stat. p-value     
2.56 0.000     4.45 <.0001     
             
N 1068  830  238  1068  723  345  
Adj. R-square  0.546  0.526  0.488  0.817  0.814  0.850  
